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Human consciousness has long been a target of social regulation. From the
religious control of ritual substances like peyote to the explicit statutory
restriction of everything from cocaine to prescription drugs, the need to
control substances that change consciousness has evolved into a complex
body of laws and practices. The laws governing consciousness, such as the
Controlled Substances Act, reflect not always a conscious choice but,
rather, a sometimes unprincipled interaction between belief current
practice, and previous laws. This interaction may have unique implications
in the future direction of healthcare, including the merger of traditional and
alternative medicine.
I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS
Human societies, through the individual and collective agency of leaders,
governments, and cultures strive to control that which has a significant
ability to influence the cognitive capacity of the individual (and consequently
the society at large). Such attempts to control consciousness are manifest in
various societies as law, myth, and tradition or, most commonly, as an
aggregate interrelationship of all three.1 Case studies from Native American
Peyotism 2 to the use of kava in the Federated States of Micronesia and
* J.D. candidate, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, 2006; A.B.
magna cum laude (highest honors-Anthropology), Harvard College, 2002; M.Phil.,
Cambridge University, 2003. I am indebted to Professor Stanley Laughlin for much-
appreciated help and guidance in formulating this Note topic. To Adrienne Fehr, I offer
my sincere gratitude for both her medical insights and her willingness to discuss them.
Thanks also are due to my friends and family for providing endless support for and
purposeful distraction from this work. Finally, my utmost appreciation is due to Bill Fash
whose patience as a scholar and kindness as a friend have been ongoing catalysts to my
desire to learn; this work grows from that desire.
1 A long history of loaded terminology surrounds the legal and cultural regulation of
consciousness in American society. As used in this discussion, the term "society" refers
to the collective attributes of a discrete geographical or social unit of collective agency.
Terms such as "tradition," "myth," and "culture" refer specifically to the acts of smaller
subsets of societal units that often transcend geographical boundaries.
2 Both the "traditional" as well as the modem political manifestations of the use of
peyote (and its constituent active chemical, mescaline) by Native American groups are
discussed in greater depth in Parts II, III, and IV.C, infra.
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abroad3 demonstrate how law, myth, and tradition are part of a complex
adaptive system of response to human stress and are thus manifestations of
the normative desire to control reality.
Human consciousness is a complex web of connotations and
assumptions, but a basic understanding of consciousness is founded on three
essential premises: (1) that consciousness is based on the physiological
processes of cognition, 4 (2) that changes to the basic physiology lead to
changes in the perceived conscious state,5 and (3) that certain substances and
processes, "psychoactives," are capable of causing changes in the basic
physiology of cognition, and hence are capable of altering consciousness. 6
The study of consciousness is, thus, the study of both human cognition
and the internal or environmental stimuli influencing cognition. Debates over
kinds of cognition, the role of psychology, and the meaning of rationality or
3 Kava is a plant (Piper methysticum) that is indigenous to several Pacific Islands
and that is used in complex ceremonial rituals. The extract of the root is widely available
as a dietary supplement and both the traditional religious, as well as modem "holistic
medicine," uses of kava are discussed in greater depth in Parts II, III, IV.D, and V, infra.
4 ROBERT E. KINGSLEY, CONCISE TEXT OF NEUROSCIENCE 525 (Lippincott, Williams
& Wilkins 2d ed.) (2000).
The cerebral cortex is perhaps the most enigmatic part of the mammalian nervous
system. Although its essential structure is quite simple, it performs the most
complex functions of any living tissue. The functional entities attributed the cerebral
cortex include learning, perception, self-awareness, free will, and the most
mysterious of all neuronal functions, consciousness.
Id.
5 "By studying brain activity, neuroscientists can probe complex phenomena such
[as] pain perception, meditation, and consciousness." The Opiate of the Masses, LANCET
NEUROLOGY, Mar. 2005, at 135.
6 Specific substances can be directly associated with corresponding changes to the
normative embodied cognition of individual agents in a given culture. For example,
ayahuasca (a common psychoactive in the Upper Amazon River Basin) contains
components from the Banisteriopsis caapi and Psychotria viridis or Diplopterys
cabrerana plants, and its active psychoactive agent, dimethyltryptamine (DMT) acts on
the 5-HT2A/2C (serotonin) receptors of the central nervous system. Joedi Riba et al.,
Effects of Ayahuasca on Sensory and Sensorimotor Gating in Humans as Measured by
P50 Suppression and Prepulse Inhibition of the Startle Reflex, Respectively, 165
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 18 (2002). Other psychoactives have their own unique effects
on cognition, and thus consciousness; for example, A9 tetrahydrocannabinol, the active
psychoactive in Cannabis sativa (marijuana) acts on the CB1 and CB2 cannabinoid-
specific receptors. ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A CONCISE,
NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS 202-07 (9th ed.) (2001). By understanding how a given substance affects human
cognition, one can better understand the changes caused by that substance to the
culturally-contextual embodied view of consciousness held by the individual.
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irrationality are frequently discussed in the literature of various fields,
including cognitive archaeology, 7 social anthropology, 8 cognitive systems
theory, 9 and psychopharmacology.' 0 Whatever the field of study, the
nomenclature of studying consciousness is extremely important.
The interaction of the brain with internal and external influences and the
perceived effects on cognition can be studied using social psychological,
cognitive systemic, and psychopharmacological approaches." The term
"altered state of consciousness" is most often used in an attempt to describe
changes to a normative Western or European view of embodied cognition.
12
In one view, embodied cognition is the structural coupling of a system and its
environment such that both are able to engage in mutual interactions.
13
Rather than a dichotomy between "reality" and "hallucination," the concept
of embodied cognition allows one to study changes to consciousness as a
local physiological adaptation to environment and culture. 14
An important distinction must be drawn between the class of all
substances or processes that may alter consciousness ("psychoactives"), and
the socially contrived nomenclature of Anglo-American legal responses to
controlling consciousness, (that is, words such as "drugs" or "controlled
substances"). Words frame our understanding of and response to an idea or
concept. 15 Strictly speaking, a "psychoactive" substance is anything that
7 See, e.g., Ian Hodder, Social Cognition, 3 CAMBRIDGE ARCHAEOLOGICAL J. 253,
255-57 (1993); Christopher Peebles, Aspects of Cognitive Archaeology, 3 CAMBRIDGE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL J. 250, 250-53 (1993).
8 See, e.g., STANLEY TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION AND THE SCOPE OF
RATIONALITY 1-2 (1990).
9 See, e.g., Naoya Hirose, An Ecological Approach to Embodiment and Cognition, 3
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RES. 289, 289 (2002); Alexander Riegler, When is a Cognitive
System Embodied?, 3 COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RES. 339 (2002).
10 See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 6, at 209-12.
11 See, e.g., Scott M. Weiss et al., Potential for Antipsychotic and Psychotomimetic
Effects ofA2A Receptor Modulation, 61 NEUROLOGY 11, Dec. 9, 2003, at S88 (describing
the potential psychoactive effects of the antagonistic interaction between dopamine (D2)
and adenosine (A2A) receptors in the treatment and prevention of psychotic disorders).
12 For example, many popular accounts of experimentation with psychoactive
substances are characterized as "research" into "altered states of consciousness." See
generally, Andrew Weil, Altered States of Consciousness, in DEALING WITH DRUG ABUSE
329 (1973) (explaining, generally and in specific contexts, the experimental research
approach to understanding consciousness through individual autonomy).
13 Riegler, supra note 9, at 347.
14 1d
15 Michael H. Cohen & Mary C. Ruggie, Integrating Complementary and
Alternative Medical Therapies in Conventional Medical Settings: Legal Quandaries and
Potential Policy Models, 72 U. CiN. L. REv. 671, 676 (2003). Cohen and Ruggie observe
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alters the physiological process of cognition. 16 This definition is independent
of culture or societal association; it is based on a normative, objective
scientific understanding of consciousness. Psychoactive substances include
so-called "street drugs," as well as caffeine, alcohol, tobacco, and chocolate;
even such physical changes as sensory deprivation (including lack of sleep,
lack of light, lack of food, etc.) may produce psychoactive effects.! 7 Whether
"hallucinogens," or "prescription drugs," "dietary supplements," or "herbal
supplements," substances that change brain physiology by acting on specific
receptor sites may be characterized as psychoactive.
That a discussion of consciousness is couched in terms of "drugs" or
"controlled substances" is a cue to the pre-framed context of the discussion:
namely, its presence in a system of law that has chosen to control certain
forms of altered consciousness by controlling the substances inducing such
altered consciousness. 18 A discussion of "drugs" is a discussion of social
classification in quasi- or semi-scientific terms. 19
Similar control of substances is found not just in the nomenclature, but
also in the cultural practices of certain societies. The mythology and
traditions of societies may provide valuable information as to how a
particular society chooses to regulate consciousness through social practice
outside the scope of the law.20
A primary contention of this Note is that the regulation of many
substances that alter consciousness shows not a value judgment with respect
that "nomenclature reflects consciousness (and regulatory and institutional policy), and
changes in nomenclature acknowledge changes in political, cultural, and social
movements." Id.
16 "Psycho" (dealing with mental processes) + "active" (producing an intended
effect). As used in this Note, psychoactive substance means any substance causing
change to the normative psychological state.
17 "[A]ltered mental status can result from depression of both cerebral hemispheres,
localized abnormality of the sleep center or global central nervous system dysfunction."
Diana King & Jeffrey R. Avner, Altered Mental Status, CLINICAL PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY
MED., Sept. 2003, at 171-73.
18 See Gail Sasnett-Stauffer & E. John Gregory, A Drug by Any Other Name is Still
a Drug: Why the Florida Judiciary Should Start Treating DUI as Any Other Drug
Offense, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299, 305 & n.22 (noting that "[ijdeally, the term
'Drug Court'. . . would encompass alcohol addiction as well," but a false dichotomy
exists in Florida's nomenclature).
19 Cohen & Ruggie, supra note 15, at 675-76.
20 See discussion in Part III, infra.
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to the substance to be regulated, 21 but rather a value judgment with respect to
the group with which the substance is most frequently associated. 22
Part II of this Note will explore how laws and regulations act to control
consciousness by examining the legal mechanisms that regulate
psychoactives and the history of such mechanisms. In Part 1I.A, federal
controlled substance statutes in the United States, Canada and the Federated
States of Micronesia are compared. Part II.B traces the specific history of
legislation in the United States as a culturally contextual response to social
pressures and, at times, an example of overt racism.
Part III of this Note discusses how myth and tradition (cultural
constructs) act to control consciousness; specifically, the use of peyote
among Native American cultural groups (Part III.A) and the use of the kava
root among Pacific Island cultures (Part III.B).
Part IV of this Note examines the interplay between legal and cultural
controls of human consciousness by examining four discrete case studies
from American legal and cultural history: (A) the American consciousness
revolution of the 1960s,23 (B) the osteopathic or allopathic medicine
debate, 24 including the role of complimentary and alternative medicine
(CAM) in American healthcare, 25 (C) the Native American Church's legal
21 See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
(1973) (tracing the prohibition of specific substances as a social response to the
disfavored groups with which those substances were associated).
22 The race-based regulation of opium (associated with Chinese immigrants in
California), cocaine (associated with blacks in the South) and marijuana (associated with
Mexican immigrants in the South) is discussed in Part II.B, infra.
23 Specifically, the social mythology surrounding the "psychedelic movement" and
the academic and literary works of Timothy Leary, Allen Ginsberg, and William S.
Burroughs are examined, with particular focus on their respective emphases on the
importance of individual autonomy in the societal regulation of consciousness. See Part
IV. infra.
24 This debate is usually framed in terms of comparing "standard" and
"experimental" therapy. Although these "norms" of treatment are applied to allopathic
and osteopathic medicine, respectively, the distinction between the two methods of
treatment is elusive at best. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy
Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 361-63 (2002)
(discussing the difficulty in distinguishing between "standard" and "experimental"
treatment in the context of informed consent for medical procedures).
25 CAM generally refers to "non-traditional," "alternative," or "holistic" healthcare
(as associated with Eastern healing techniques). See Kathleen M. Boozang, Western
Medicine Opens the Door to Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 185-91
(1998) (discussing the slow integration of CAM and "traditional" allopathic medical
techniques).
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success in securing religious use rights to ingest peyote, and (D) the
regulation of "dietary supplements" including the kava root.
Finally, in Part V, a proactive approach and pre-reform proposal is
offered in the hope that, by understanding the legal and cultural context in
which the desire and need to control consciousness arises, U.S. policies with
respect to. psychoactive substances may prove more economically efficient
and productive to the general health of citizens. Specifically, the continued
deregulation of dietary supplements may allow for the increased use of CAM
as a cost-effective, proactive alternative to traditional (and comparatively
cost-inefficient) reactive pharmaceutical medicine. 26
II. LAW AS THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH THE
REGULATION OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
The most common means by which consciousness is socially controlled
in the United States, Canada, the Federated States of Micronesia, and most
countries, is through federal laws that place certain psychoactive substances
on a list of "controlled substances" for purposes of pharmaceutical
distribution and federal criminal control.27 In a comparative context, the most
26 The potential economic efficiency of herbal supplements as opposed to traditional
pharmaceuticals is a topic of increasing public debate. See, e.g., M. Paul Jackson, More
People Are Turning to Herbs to Save Money: Alternatives Carry Risks, Experts Say,
WINSTON-SALEM J., May 20, 2005, at B1 (noting that "alternative remedies [including
herbal supplements] allow [users] to treat such ailments as depression and chronic pain
without incurring out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs").
27 In the United States, state-specific regulation of psychoactives is another means of
control. One of the important issues in any debate over how a society will choose to
restrict access to a substance is the scale of collective agency. See, e.g., Steven Rosen,
Dawn of a Drug Culture: Beats Sought Spiritual Alternative to Post- War World, DENVER
POST, Dec. 5, 2004, at F13 (noting the origins of "drug culture" in individual autonomy
and the desire for a collective autonomy in post-war America). Whereas federal
regulation of certain classes of substances is useful for standardization of risk, the state-
specific regulation of less harmful substances may foster more of a sense of regionalized,
as opposed to nationalized, collective agency. For example, an individual state may, as a
collective actor, view the less restrictive regulation of Schedule I controlled substances as
beneficial to state health care policy and pursue the deregulation of such substances. See
Dominica Minore Bassett, Note, Medical Use and Prescription of Schedule I Drugs in
Arizona: Is the Battle Moot?, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 441, 441-42 (1998) (discussing Arizona's
attempts to bypass federal regulatory restrictions under the CSA). See also Joseph L.
Galiber, A Bill to Repeal Criminal Drug Laws: Replacing Prohibition with Regulation,
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831, 831 (1990) (detailing State Senator Galiber's proposal to the
New York State Legislature to "regulate all drugs currently proscribed as illegal in
precisely the same manner as alcohol").
1316 [Vol. 66:1311
PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES, DIETARYSUPPLEMENTS
interesting feature of such controlled substance acts is the amount of
international variation in the decision regarding which substances to
regulate. 28 Substances that are prohibited from individual ingestion in some
countries are permitted in others and the very laws that define controlled
substances are not always based on objective scientific classification, but
often on perceived societal pressures for the regulation, or lack thereof, of
certain substances.29
A. Federal "Schedules " in the United States, Canada, and the
Federated States of Micronesia
In the United States, most psychoactive substances are regulated
according to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (including
Schedules I-V of "controlled substances") 30 and are often referred to as
"drugs." For example, peyote, or Lophophora williamsii or Lophophora
diffusa, contains mescaline, and both the organic cactus and its most active
constituent chemical are regulated under Schedule I of the Controlled
28 Particularly noteworthy is the current international debate over the
decriminalization of marijuana as a return to therapeutic approaches to the consumption
of psychoactive substances. For an in-depth discussion of this international tension
between the United States and Canada particularly, see generally, Kara Godbehere
Goodwin, Is the End of the War in Sight: An Analysis of Canada's Decriminalization of
Maryuana and the Implications for the United States' "War on Drugs, " 22 BUFF. PUB.
INT. L.J. 199 (2003) (tracing the history of regulation in both countries and examining the
growing international trend in therapeutic approaches).
29 In this sense, both historical and modem cultural perceptions of a specific
substance are necessary to inform any state-action policy decision. For example, the well-
publicized decision of the Netherlands to semi-legalize (i.e., make illegal but softly
enforce violations of laws restricting) the use of marijuana was a response to a
government-sponsored commission (the Baan Commission, formed in 1968) to determine
the best state response to excessive use of the already restricted substance. Kurt V. Laker,
Note, Smoke and Mirrors: The Self-Examination of Canadian Marijuana Policy in the
Context of Decriminalization in the Netherlands, 14 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 341,
365-70 (2003). A similar state-action policy review took place in Canada with the Senate
Committee's Cannabis Report of 2002, which led ultimately to softened restrictions on
marijuana use in Canada. Id. at 354. By contrast, American policy with respect to many
Schedule I controlled substances has long been and remains a policy of non-review. Id. at
341 & n.3 (citing H.R. 135, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (a recent failed attempt by the
United States Congress to make official the non-consideration of and to remove funding
from any investigation into the medical viability of Schedule I substances, regardless of
medical or scientific evidence)).
30 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-812 (2000).
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Substances Act (CSA). 31 Of further interest is the dichotomy 32 in the United
States between alcohol and other psychoactive substances. 33 It seems
counterintuitive that a federal system for the regulation of substances deemed
potentially dangerous to individuals would disregard the actual irreversibility
of excessive use of such substances, yet this is precisely what the false or
unnecessary 34 dichotomy between "alcohol" and "controlled substances"
31 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c), sched. I (c) (11)-(12) (2000). There are five "Schedules" of
controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Schedule I is the most
restricted Schedule and the only classification that precludes physicians from prescribing
the listed substances. Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don 't. The
Need for Comprehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain,
13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 81, 87 (2004). Substances listed in Schedules II, III, IV, and V
may all be prescribed by a licensed physician, with decreasing respective restrictions on
use. These restrictions are based on: (1) the potential for abuse, (2) the prominence of
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and (3) the potential for the
substance to cause psychological or physical dependence. Id. For an in-depth discussion
of the specific differences between and prescriptive requirements for Schedules II
through V, see id. at 87-89.
32 Alcohol and tobacco are not listed in the CSA, but are regulated instead by 26
U.S.C. §§ 5001-5701 (2000) (the Internal Revenue Code, which determines taxation of
alcohol) and Title 27 of the United States Code on the regulation of alcohol, tobacco, and
firearms (a strange triumvirate of disparate entities), which regulates the transportation
and sale of alcohol and tobacco. Arguably, tobacco and alcohol are conceptually and
functionally more similar to pharmaceuticals and dietary supplements than they are to
firearms. On a state-by-state level, drinking ages, smoking ages, and more specific
regulations are enacted. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 607, 659-60 (1985) (citing interstate variation in state drinking laws as the
cause of increased interstate traffic accidents).
33 It is the explicit restraint from including alcohol and tobacco in the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301-331 (2000)) that effectively takes these substances
outside of the regulatory control of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). See FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) ("Congress has clearly
precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products."). Similarly,
recent amendments (e.g., the Dietary Supplement Health Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (codified as amended in various
sections of 21 U.S.C.)) to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(s)(6) (2000), have "effectively neutered the Agency's authority to regulate dietary
supplements.... Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing
the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 329, 348-49 (1998). Cf, Cass R.
Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47
DuKE L.J. 1013, 1013 (1998) (arguing that the FDA power to regulate "drugs" should
extend to the regulation of tobacco).
34 See Galiber, supra note 27, at 839 ("It is difficult to convince someone that using
(or selling for a profit) one terribly damaging euphoric-alcohol-is a morally neutral
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accomplishes. 35 Even within the CSA, the empirical basis for placing certain
substances (e.g., marijuana) in Schedule I has been questioned as a quasi-
scientific "political ploy." 36
Similar to the United States' Controlled Substances Act, in Canada and
the Federated States of Micronesia, federal schedules place certain
substances on a list that necessitates governmental regulation for
distribution.37 In Canada, for example, mescaline is prohibited for
unapproved (non-medical) use by Schedule III of the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act.38 Interestingly, peyote (which contains mescaline) is
explicitly exempted from this prohibition. 39 In the Federated States of
event, yet using (or selling) another damaging euphoric--cocaine-is so immoral that we
shall send the user to jail for a long time.").
35 See Peter W. Vik et al., Cognitive Impairment in Substance Abuse, 27
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 97, 100 (2004). Prolonged use of alcohol (i.e., alcoholism)
can lead to permanent cognitive impairment. This permanent impairment, called
Wemicke-Korsakoff Syndrome, occurs in ten percent of alcoholics. Id. By contrast,
"controlled studies of the long-term effects of marijuana use fail to demonstrate a
relationship between prolonged use and permanent neuropsychological dysfunction." Id.
at 102. Marijuana remains a Schedule I banned controlled substance; alcohol is not
regulated by the CSA. Even the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled
substance (which requires that it have no medically accepted beneficial use) is contrary to
recent evidence. Robert W. Gorter et al., Medical Use of Cannabis in the Netherlands, 64
NEUROLOGY 917, 917 (2005). In the Gorter study, over sixty-four percent of patients
given cannabis to determine the drug's medical efficacy "reported a good or excellent
effect on their symptoms." Id.; see also Annaliese Smith, Comment, Marijuana as a
Schedule I Substance: Political Ploy or Accepted Science?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
1137, 1158-64 (2000). Given that A9-tetrahydrocanabinol, the primary active constituent
in marijuana, is also the active constituent of Marinol, a prescription pharmaceutical, the
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance with "no medically
accepted beneficial use" seems inconsistent with perceived medical wisdom. Id at 1158.
36 Smith, supra note 35, at 1166-67. Smith argues that empirical data suggest that
marijuana would be more appropriately classified as a Schedule III controlled substance.
Id.
37 E.g., CODE OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA tit. 11, § 1119 (1999);
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 17 (1996).
38 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 17 (1996).
39 Id. Section 17 of Schedule III bans "Mescaline (3, 4, 5-
trimethoxybenzeneethanamine) and any salt thereof, but not peyote (Lophophora)." Id.
(emphasis added). This culturally derived exemption for religious use by Natives is
analogous to the United States' similar exemption for traditional use by registered Native
American uses in religious contexts:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt
from registration. [Furthermore,] [a]ny person who manufactures peyote for or
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Micronesia, by contrast, mescaline and peyote are explicitly prohibited with
language identical to the United States' CSA.40
The historical development of the controlled substances schedules of the
Federated States of Micronesia is a salient example of the interplay between
societal values and the promulgation of regulatory laws.41 The Federated
States of Micronesia's schedules were adopted wholly from the Controlled
Substances Act of the United States. They read identically. This wholesale
adoption explains the, similar restrictions on peyote and mescaline as not a
societal decision, but, rather, a legal inheritance. 42  An additional
distributes peyote to the Native American Church, however, is required to obtain
registration annuallyand to comply with all other requirements of law.
See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2000); see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (2000) (establishing an explicit exception from criminal liability for
peyote use by registered members of the Native American Church). This fairly recent
exemption was the product of political lobbying by Native groups and is discussed in
greater depth in Part IV(C), infra. Interestingly, state-by-state regulation of psychoactive
substances (particularly for purposes of religious exemption for traditional groups) varies
greatly in scope and motive, from non-extant to broad-sweeping policies. See Michael M.
O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REv. 783, 821 (2004) ("Most states
have adopted a version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which was first
promulgated in 1970 both to bring greater uniformity among the states and to
complement federal drug policies. Yet, within just a few years, states began to adopt
dramatically different penalty schemes for drug offenses.") (citation omitted).
40 11 FEDERATED STATES MICRONESIA CODE § 1119(3)(n) & (o) (2000) (makes
possession or ingestion of mescaline and peyote a criminal offense).
41 Claudia Strauss & Naomi Quinn offer an interesting heuristic that shows how
cultural preconceptions influence policy decisions: the distinction that shoppers make in
supermarkets between different kinds of cheeses. Based on prior cultural or personal
experiences-which are typically coextensive with respect to the individual-some
shoppers "habitually choose organic goat's cheese, some American cheese, and others
brie." CLAUDIA STRAUSS & NAOMI QUINN, A COGNITIvE THEORY OF CULTURAL
MEANING 43 (1997). To indiscriminately, and without proper research, apply the
supermarket cheese selection of one society (British, for example) on another society
(American, for example) is to ignore the traditions of the given society (i.e., its culture)
with respect to preexisting preference for one cheese or another. Imagine if American
supermarkets were filled with thirty varieties of cheddar; or, conversely, try to find the
American singles in a British supermarket. In this same way, when not based on proper
cultural (and scientific) health research, the imposition of the United States' controlled
substances Schedules on another society (like Micronesia) ignores local culture and
negates the importance of regionalized collective agency. In some respects, the United
States' restriction of substances without regard to perceived non-medical cultural benefits
(i.e., perceived benefits as agents that alter consciousness in unique cultural settings) is
arguably similar to the culturally dissociated importation of foreign substances.
42 See Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.
469 (1995) (arguing that the wholesale transplantation of laws is an overly simplified
means of understanding how interaction between legal cultures produces changes in legal
philosophy).
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consequence of this wholesale adoption of the United States' Controlled
Substances Act is the failure of the laws of the Federated States of
Micronesia to account for local indigenous substances that alter
consciousness, such as kava .(Piper methysticum).43 Having. been exported to
multiple other countries as either a traditional tea made from the root or as an
herbal supplement, kava has been placed on the controlled substances
schedules or otherwise regulated federally in numerous countries including
Canada,an the United Kingdom, 45 Germany, Australia, and Norway.46 No
real regulation of the use of kava exists in the United States or in the
Federated States of Micronesia. 47
Comparison of the federal regulations of substances in multiple countries
quickly reveals that many international attitudes toward psychoactive
substances are culturally contextual.48 Even at the level of federal -schedules,
43 Kava is also known as "ava, awa, gea, gi, intoxicating pepper, kao, kavain, kawa-
pfeffer, kew, long pepper, malohu, maluk, meruk, milik, rauschpfeffer, sakau, tonga,
worzelstock, yagona, [and] yangona." Dirty Dozen: Twelve Supplements to Avoid, in OB
GYN NEWS, May 15, 2004, at 21.
44 Heather S. Boon & Albert H. C. Wong, Kava: A Test Case for Canada's New
Approach to Natural Health Products, 169 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 1163, 1163-64
(2003) ("Health Canada... announced that kava products were to be regulated as
conventional drugs in the future.").
45 The United Kingdom's Medicines Control Agency placed an order before
Parliament banning the importation of kava due to reports of liver toxicity. See Joanna
Blythman, Health: Give Us Back Our Sanity, THE INDEP., Sept. 20, 2004, at A8;
Christopher Booker, Culled Herbs: Kava Kava Is Not a Danger, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH,
Mar. 28, 2004, at A16. See also Nutraingredients.com, Kava Banned in UK, (Dec. 23,
2002), http://www.nutraingredients.com/news/news-ng.asp?id=37001-kava-banned-in.
46 See generally Jennifer Anke & Igbol Romzan, Pharmacokinetic and
Pharmacodynamic Drug Interactions with Kava (Piper methysticum Forst. f), J.
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY, Aug. 1, 2004, at 153, 153-60 (discussing the rise in popularity
of kava and subsequent ban in several countries due to possible implications in cases of
liver failure).
47 Kava is regulated through federal statutory controls on food supplements. The
FDCA and administrative regulations of the FDA form the primary bases upon which
kava and other "dietary supplements" are regulated. This regulation includes approval of
health claims on dietary supplements. See Amber K. Spencer, Note, The FDA Knows
Best... Or Does It? First Amendment Protection of Health Claims on Dietary
Supplements: Pearson v. Shalala, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 96 (2000) (noting that FDA
approval of health claims are based on "the totality of publicly available scientific
evidence," including agreement among experts and evidence in support of the claims);
see also Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118-20 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that
First Amendment rights to free speech are invoked by ability of dietary supplement
manufacturers to make legitimate health claims in labeling).
48 This comports with the socially-contextual presumptions of cognitive models for
human behavior. See, e.g., STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 41, at 43.
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the control of consciousness is a decidedly contextual practice that differs
from society to society. Groups that have a vested interest in a particular
substance have more of a motivation for the lessened regulation of that
substance. 49 In this way, entire cultural systems of interaction are built and
laws are enacted to reflect these practices. 50
B. A Brief History ofAmerican Regulation: Paternalism and Racist
Laws
The history of psychoactive substance regulation in the United States is
littered with mixed and questionable motives for enacting restrictions on use,
including largely Judeo-Christian-biased paternalism during the Progressive
Era.51 From explicit racism to paternalistic overreaction to perceived changes
in social dynamics, 52 the regulation of psychoactive substances in the United
States is a history of somewhat irrational irregularities. 5
3
49 See Vesemaca Rarabici, Kava Group Lobbies, Fiji TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at 12
(reporting the increased lobbying efforts of Pacific Island groups to reintroduce kava to
European countries that have banned the herb, citing recent studies that challenge the
previously reported health risks of kava); see also Verenaisi Raicola, Ban on Kava Lifted,
Fiji TIMES, May 15, 2005, at 4 (noting a recent decision of German government to
partially lift the ban on kava).
50 For example, bars and alcohol in America, hooka bars and hashish in the Middle
East, and sakau bars and kava in Pohnpei (Federated States of Micronesia).
51 See, e.g., Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism and the Intersection of
Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 71-73 (1996)
(discussing how Congress overcame States' rights concerns and enacted the first federal
regulation on the use of "narcotics," the 1914 Harrison Act, by drawing particular
attention to the "specter of the black rapist preying on white women"); Edward H.
Williams, Negro Cocaine "Fiend, " Are A New Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1914, at 12 (a seminal example of racially motivated stigmatization of specific substances
as associated with discrete ethnic minorities).
52 See Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America's Drug War:
Hidden Racism Revealed By Examining the Hysteria Over Crack, 54 ALA. L. REv. 665,
679 (2003) (employing critical race theory and arguing that racist myth and labor market
paternalism were primary causes of federal regulation of cocaine between 1914-1918 and
beyond).
53 No principled medically-based distinction exists between many pharmaceuticals,
dietary supplements, alcohol, and tobacco (all of which are regulated under wholly
disparate federal and state schema). See Vik et al., supra note 35, at 100, 102 (noting the
comparatively more harmful long-term effects of alcoholism when contrasted with
excessive marijuana use); see also Kevin M. Raduege, Anesthetic Considerations of the
Herbal, Kava, 16 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 305, 307 (2004). The ability of kavain, a
constituent of kava, to block the reuptake of dopamine causes the "sedative and euphoric
effects" of other psychoactive substances. Id. Yet, kava is a largely unregulated "dietary
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Prior to the twentieth century, little or no regulation of any psychoactive
substance was statutorily mandated, and physicians could freely distribute
many substances now banned by federal statute. 54 Central to the
promulgation of federal regulatory schemes for "controlled substances" were
two historical trends:55 (1) increased rights or economic success of minority
citizens, and (2) the resulting social and legislative responses of paternalistic
white individuals and groups.56 This white Judeo-Christian response often
drew on a popular social mythology that men, more than women, and
minorities, more than whites, comprised the majority of "drug" users, often
characterized as "heathens" or "fiends. '57
The increased economic competition of Chinese immigrants in California
was a likely cause of the first desires to regulate, on both a state and federal
level, the distribution and consumption of opium.58 State-level legislation
supplement." See also Galiber, supra note 27, at 839-40 (discussing the irrationality of
distinguishing regulatory schemes for alcohol, tobacco and controlled substances).
The hypocrisy of imposing severe penalties on one form of potentially self-
destructive personal behavior while all but ignoring criminal sanction for other
forms of the same conduct is not easily justified to those who believe that reason and
consistency should be the hallmark of public policy and criminal laws.
Id. at 840 (citation omitted).
54 "'[P]ractitioners of nineteenth-century medicine had little power to cure disease.
The main thing the physician could do was to make the patient feel better, and [narcotics]
were preeminent for these functions and were apparently used with great frequency."'
Sandy, supra note 52, at 678 (quoting Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and
the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2605 (1994)).
55 These trends were prevalent long before the original adoption of the CSA in 1970,
from which the nomenclature of "controlled substances" sprang.
56 See MUSTO, supra note 21, at 255 n. 15 (discussing specific instances of racial
stereotyping as leading to regulation of substances associated with the disfavored group);
see also Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African
American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 55-56 (1995)
(citing and discussing MUSTO, supra note 21, in a broader discussion of racist
motivations in American criminal justice with respect to minorities). "The prohibition of
certain drugs has [long] reflected racial stereotyping .... 'Cocaine raised the specter of
the wild Negro, opium the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps in the slums."' Id.
(quoting MUSTO, supra note 21, at 255 n.15).
57 See Williams, supra note 51, at 12; infra Part II.B. Contrary to this social
mythology, America's "rather large addict population included more females than males,
more whites than blacks, and was confined neither to particular geographical regions nor
to areas of high population concentration." Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread,
The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of
American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 982-83 (1970) (citations omitted).
See discussion of myth functioning as law in Part IV, infra.
58 "[A]lthough mainstream [white] women were the modal category of opiate users,
images of Chinese opium smokers and opium dens were invoked by opponents of drug
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was quickly enacted in West Coast states with high Chinese populations to
specifically prohibit the sale of opium for non-medical use. 59 This regulation,
however, was motivated by thinly disguised anti-Chinese animus 60 and
represented less of an attempt to prohibit a "vice" and more of a "desire to
vex and annoy the 'Heathen Chinee' [sic]."'61
Similar to the racially motivated state regulations on opium, the first
federal regulation of cocaine in the United States was an arguably racist
response to social mythology concerning black Americans. 62 Unnerved by
emancipation and the resultant job competition and inevitably changing
social structure, white activists lobbied against not just substances, but the
individuals with whom those substances were most intimately or
"dangerously" associated.63 Unsubstantiated myths abounded about cocaine
giving blacks "superhuman strength, cunning and efficiency" prompting
these "superhuman" minorities to "rape White women," obtain improved
marksmanship, and become "impervious to .32 caliber bullets."64
Similar to the restriction of opium as a response to anti-Chinese animus
and the regulation of cocaine as a social response to anti-black sentiments,
the initial restriction on the use of marijuana in the United States was
arguably a class-based, anti-Mexican prohibition designed to target a
disfavored ethnic minority.65 State legislation was passed to stop the spread
use and form part of the backdrop [of the first federal regulation of opium]." Michael
Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 39.
59 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 57, at 996.
60 Holden-Smith, supra note 51, at 71 ("Many in the nascent drug reform movement
viewed Chinese immigrants as primarily responsible for the spread of opium addiction to
the larger white society.").
61 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 57, at 997 (quoting Ex parte Yung Jon, 28 F.
308, 312 (D. Ore. 1886)).
62 Sandy, supra note 52, at 679. An in-depth discussion of myth functioning as law
in various contexts is found in Part IV, infra.
63 MUSTO, supra note 21, at 255 n.15.
64 Sandy, supra note 52, at 679. Ironically, few would argue today that cocaine-
riddled low-income minority neighborhoods are riddled with "superhuman ... cunning
and efficiency." Yet, such a mythology was itself part of the basis for making the
substance illegal. Id.
65 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 57, at 1012. Not comforting in the origin of
marijuana regulation, but distracting from the probable racist intent by Western states, the
motivation for marijuana prohibition in the East seems to have been the a-scientific belief
that marijuana has "practically the same effect as morphine and cocaine." Id. at 1017. In a
modern pharmacological context, this contention is indefensible. See Eric W. Reynolds &
Henrietta S. Bada, Pharmacology of Drug Abuse, 30 OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY CLINICS
N. AM. 501, 512 (2003) (noting the unique action of marijuana on the cannabinoid
receptors, CB1 and CB2).
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of the "Mexican herb."'66 Ultimately, federal legislation67 limiting the sale of
marijuana was passed without a single federal or state empirical or scientific
study of the effects of marijuana.68
The restriction of opium, the regulation of cocaine, and the limited use
(and ultimate ban) of marijuana may all be viewed, in the above contexts, not
only as racist responses to perceived threats to authority, but also as the
collective product of the paternalism of Judeo-Christian mores during the
Progressive Era. The regulation of individuals (minorities) was accomplished
via restrictions on the use of the substances with which those individuals
were associated. 69 These cultural decisions by the United States show, in
part, how the mythology and traditions of a culture can masquerade as-and
ultimately be promulgated as-substantive statutory laws.
III. MYTH AND TRADITION AS THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
In the same way that federal schedules and agency regulations seek to
control consciousness through the direct regulation of the chemical
substances that may alter consciousness, so too do myth and tradition often
serve to constrain or shape both individual and collective understandings of
consciousness. One example of such social control is seen in the role of
tradition as a means of social control in the peyotism of Native Americans. 70
Another example is found in the mythology and social practices surrounding
the ingestion of kava in the Pacific Islands.
66 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 57, at 1014. "'When some beet field peon takes
a few rares of this stuff.. . [h]e thinks he has just been elected president of
Mexico... [and] stage[s] imaginary bullfights .... "' Id. (quoting THE MONTANA
STANDARD, Jan. 27, 1929, at 3 (comments of Dr. Fred Flusher).
67
.Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed
1970). In 1970, the Marijuana Tax Act was repealed upon adoption of the CSA, which
was substantially more restrictive on the use of marijuana, making it a Schedule I
controlled substance.
68 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 57, at 1021.
69 See, e.g., MUSTO, supra note 21, at 255 n. 15.
70 The modem political lobbying efforts of Native Americans and the successful
attainment of federal legislation exempting Native use of peyote are further discussed in
Part IV(C), infra.
2005] 1325
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
A. Peyotism-Tradition and Social Practice as the Control of
Consciousness
Peyote has been used by the indigenous cultures of North America for
thousands of years as part of a complex cultural tradition embedded in social
practices that serve to regulate the consciousness of individuals. 71 However,
not all Native American groups used peyote as a part of rituals. 72 Among
groups that did, though, the social practice of its cultural use internally
regulated access to peyote and the situations in which peyote could be
ingested.73
Peyote was and is used in limited contexts, such as healing and
divination ceremonies in which individuals would attempt to commune with
ancestral spirits to ask for their aegis in current social problems.74 The nature
of such rituals is decidedly control-based. Indeed, some modern groups of
Native Americans so regulated the use of peyote in rituals that they imposed
an internal cultural ban on its ingestion. 75
Peyote use was and is typically confined to a peyote circle in which those
given the authority to ingest peyote gather and perform complex rituals based
on tradition to gain access to spiritual guidance.76 The use of peyote outside
of such purposeful divination is sufficiently shamed by Native American
society at large that the abuse of peyote is not a significant cultural
problem. 77
Problems in the regulation of peyote are frequently the result of cultural
clashes between "western" and "native" beliefs about the proper role of
71 See Jan G. Bruhn et al., Mescaline Use for 5700 Years, 359 LANCET 1866, 1866
(discussing the historical longevity of the use of Peyote's constituent psychoactive
substance, mescaline, in the cultural practices of pre-Columbian and modem populations
in Mexico and North America).
7 2 See generally DAVID F. ABERLE, THE PEYOTE RELIGION AMONG THE NAVAHO
(1966) (describing the process by which Peyotism was imposed on and often rejected by
certain native populations).
73 RICHARD RUDGLEY, THE ALCHEMY OF CULTURE: INTOXICANTS IN SOCIETY 74
(1993).
74 See, e.g., L. Bryce Boyer et al., Shamanism and Peyote Use Among the Apaches
of the Mescalero Indian Reservation, in HALLUCINOGENS AND SHAMANISM pt. IV
(Michael Hamer ed., 1973) (articulating the role of peyote among Apache Natives as
based in a system of shamanic divination).
75 Id. at 53.
76 ABERLE, supra note 72, at 117.
77 Id.
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society or government in the control of consciousness. 78 Generally, though,
the tradition of Peyotism is sufficient to allow the internal regulation of its
use by a particular native group, without the influence of federal laws.79
B. Kava-Mythology and Social Practice as the Control of
Consciousness
Kava consumption is an important social ritual in various contexts within
many Pacific Island cultures. 80 From the Federated States of Micronesia to
Hawai'i, the ingestion of kava signals valuable information about political,
religious, and economic structures in the societies in which it is consumed. 81
In fact, the very practice of kava consumption and the observed right of
different individuals to access the tea made from the root of kava both give
clues as to social relationships and perceived status within a group.82 Put
differently, "[r]egulations on kava usage-who drinks and who does not,
where one drinks and with whom-separate important categories of people
in island cultures. 83
Distinctions are made in many contexts between the right of access based
on differences and divisions between polarized groups, that is, men and
women, chief and commoner, religious traditionalist and Christian, old and
young. 84 Kava is also mythologized to impart access to the ancestral spirits
on the individual ingesting the tea in a ritual context. Kava is thus an
important traditional exchange item that is regulated both by traditional
social hierarchies as well as mythological or spiritual guidelines. 85
Evolving mythology plays an important role in the regulation of kava
consumption. Origin myths about the first ancestors to consume kava shed
light on the reflexive relationship between modem social demands and the
evocation of myth as a sort of law: "[p]opular tales of the origins of kava
shape people's appreciation and consumption of the drug. Conversely,
changes in everyday kava use may reflect back to transform how Islanders
tell their kava myths (or which versions they choose to tell)."'86 Mythologies
78 Id. at56.
7 9 Id. at 117.
80 See generally VINCENT LEBOT ET AL., KAVA: THE PACIFIC DRUG (1992) (detailing
the prevalence of kava consumption in various Pacific Island cultures).
8 1 1d. at 119.
82 Raduege et al., supra note 53, at 306.
83 LEBOT ET AL., supra note 80, at 120.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 121-22.
86 Id. at 121-24.
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vary from internal myths about the discovery of kava by locals to external
myths about the importation of kava by a god or wandering religious or
spiritual figure. Depending on the particular affinity that a culture has for the
use of kava, the mythology may change to reflect desired modem
perceptions. For example, one internal myth claims that kava was discovered
by following a kava-inebriated rat to the plant.87 This comports with a sense
of pride in the intra-cultural development of an important tradition. 88
External mythologies often tell of a supernatural being having given the
root to a culture. 89 This external justification for kava entering a given
society is often used to justify the lack of necessity for the consumption of
kava.90 This use of extrinsic mythology to give negative connotations to kava
is likely a cultural response to a desire for heightened internal regulation of
the substance: a sort of "law" of cultural mythology.91
Mythological justifications and social practice in Pacific Island societies
provide a powerful example of the regulation of consciousness through non-
traditional "legal" frameworks. Differences in accounts of kava origins thus
vary correspondingly with the unique demands of particular societies.92
IV. LAW AS MYTH AND TRADITION-MYTH AND TRADITION AS LAW
In the same way that law may function as myth and tradition, so too may
myth and tradition function in certain contexts as law.93 Four unique contexts
can provide a means by which to understand the interaction of these two
related yet divergent concepts: (1) America in the 1960s highlights the clash
between governmental and individual interests in the control of
87 Other internal myths include the spontaneous sprouting of the plant from a buried
human corpse, and most often from the vagina of a dead woman. See Edmund Leach, The
Structure of Symbolism, in THE INTERPRETATION OF RITUAL 239 (J. S. LaFontaine ed.,
1972) (describing various origin mythologies for the introduction of kava).
88 LEBOT ET AL., supra note 80, at 122.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 RON BRUNTON, THE ABANDONED NARCOTIC: KAVA AND CULTURAL INSTABILITY
IN MELANESIA 95 (1989).
92 LEBOT ET AL., supra note 80, at 122-24.
93 This view of law is a conjunctive and more anthropological perspective of Alan
Watson's general thesis that the growth of legal culture is the product of the cross-
fertilization (or transplantation) of other cultures' laws. See generally William Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence (H): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 489
(1995) (outlining the development of Watson's theory and in particular the idea that if the
transplantation of laws explains changes to legal culture, then the positive law concept of
law as response to forces external to the law is called into question).
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"consciousness"; (2) the long-term development of osteopathic medicine as
challenged by the institutional interests of allopathic physicians shows how
the ability to regulate consciousness produces a guarded effect with the intent
to limit access to resources; (3) the modem Peyotism movement among
Native American groups shows how modem political activism can alter the
dominant social approach to regulating consciousness; (4) the expansion of
kava into a global market shows how global market forces act to produce
unique interactions between law, myth, and tradition in a modem
international system of exchange.
A. America in the 1960s
During the 1960s, America was internally divided and at odds with its
own sense of culture. Reflections of this internal dissonance are found in the
reality of law having functioned as myth and tradition and the consequences
of myth and tradition having functioned as law. Many examples exist of such
cross-fertilization of influences, including the "psychedelic movement," its
reflections in literature, societal proposals for drug policy reform or pre-
reform, 94 and the human consequences of these varied influences. Advocates
for the responsible control of the "psychedelic movement" were justifiably at
odds with the unchecked presumptive governmental regulation of potentially
society-altering substances with the real power to unite and divide
individuals and entire groups. 95 The modem making of legal mythology was
an inevitable consequence of the clash between the desire for governmental
control and the desire of individuals to be free to experiment with their own
consciousness.
. One proponent of the psychedelic movement was Timothy Leary, whose
adoption of the use of LSD in educational settings forced Harvard
University-and the country-to consider the risks associated with such
behavior. Leary's notion of the "turn on, tune in, drop out" approach to
psychoactive substances was based in some part of the revolutionary
94 See Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., LSD-25 and the Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform
Proposal, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 23 (1967). Laughlin's pre-reform proposals, including
alternatives to the strict criminalization process that was ultimately adopted, are
particularly resonant when weighed in light of the relative failure of the "War on Drugs"
in terms of reform of individuals and governmental regulation of "controlled substances."
See Tally M. Wiener, Note, Drug Policy Priorities in the Wake of the June 1998 Drug
Summit, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 759 (1999).
95 See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[The concern of
the court] is with the laws of the United States, which appellant [Timothy Leary]
admittedly, knowingly and purposely violated because they conflicted with his personal
religious beliefs and practices.")
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examination of various media as both a process and a result of the process.96
Leary's approach to the social control of consciousness was a prophetic
description of what kinds of positivistic laws should govern altered
consciousness. He proposed two "commandments" for the "Molecular Age"
(modem age of understanding psychoactive interactions): (1) "Thou shalt not
alter the consciousness of thy fellow man," and (2) "Thou shalt not prevent
thy fellow man from altering his own consciousness. '97 These arguably
natural law concepts were couched, instead, as a positivist reaction to
advanced scientific knowledge and, hence, were an example of current
cultural practice and belief masquerading as a normative kind of "law." 98
A further example of myth and tradition as "law" during the 1960s (and,
indeed, in a larger diachronic frame) is found in the political essays of Allen
Ginsberg. 99 Very much like the positivist justifications of Leary, Ginsberg
proposed a brand of modem spiritualism that required the suspension of
federal regulation of psychoactives for the purpose of experimentation in
collective consciousness. Arguing that the mass experimentation with
psychoactives by society was the solution to our global tensions, Ginsberg
pushed for a "law of the spirit," a strange blend of positivism and natural law
that called for the development and regulation of spirituality outside of the
normal confines of the American legal system:
[I]ndividual soul development.., is our law transcending the illusions of
the political state.... I propose, then, that everybody including the
President and his and our vast hordes of generals, executives, judges and
legislators of these States go to nature, find a kindly teacher or Indian
peyote chief or guru guide, and assay their consciousness with LSD. 00
Ginsberg's brand of chemical spiritualism and similar suggestions of the
right to individual altered consciousness were largely ignored by those in
positions of power, but echoed repeatedly in the popular social attitude to
experimentation during the 1960s.
9 6 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 5 (1964).
97 TIMOTHY LEARY, THE POLITICS OF ECSTASY 95 (1980).
98 See Watson, supra note 42, at 470-73 (showing how religious "commandments"
can trace the development of legal culture as either a reflection of natural law or as a
positivist reaction to cultural history, or both).
99 See, e.g., Allen Ginsberg, Personal Consciousness, in DELIBERATE PROSE:
SELECTED ESSAYS 1952-1995, at 125 (2000) [hereinafter Ginsberg, Personal
Consciousness] Everybody Should Get High for the Next Ten Years (1959), reprinted in
GINSBERG, PROSE, supra, at 134.
100 Ginsberg, Personal Consciousness, supra note 99, at 126-27.
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Whereas Leary and Ginsberg advocated the expansion of the individual
right to alter consciousness, the human side of the negative effects and social
limitation of the use of psychoactives is evident in the literature of William
S. Burroughs. 1° 1 Burroughs, whose autobiography, Naked Lunch, was the
subject of intense litigation over its alleged obscenity, 0 2 was a heroin addict
and wrote about the natural cultural constraints of such behavior outside of
the role of the law. The "law" of social pressures and human relationships is
another form of control that exerts influence over individuals to limit altered
consciousness in certain ways. Burroughs analogizes the law of social
pressure with respect to addicts to the responsive physiology of a rabid
dog. 10 3 Burroughs argued that no federal law could justifiably punish an
individual for a physiological dependence that alters the ability to
consciously decide whether to ingest a given substance; the "algebra of need"
rather than the Federal Controlled Substances Act dictates the individual
control of consciousness at a chemical level. 104
As seen in the struggles of Burroughs and others similarly affected by
addictive psychoactives, the regulation of consciousness, even in America,
often has not only legal, but also cultural mechanisms for control, including
common social practice and even financial restrictions on access to
resources.
In general, the American consciousness revolution of the 1960s is an
important heuristic that may show how law acts as a constraint on social
ideas about the control of consciousness. Law is both the boundary and the
catalyst for challenges to the boundary of what a society will allow
individuals to change about their own consciousness. In many ways, the
failure of criminal responses to "drug" crimes is very much a product of the
refusal of federal legislators to recognize the true social and cultural limits of
controlled substances. A balance must be struck in any society between
religious or spiritual practices and the paternalistic right of government to
regulate.' 0 5 Mismatched cultural and legal limits must inevitably lead to a
high rate of "criminal" but socially-normative behavior that seeks to alter
individual consciousness.
101 See, e.g., WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS, NAKED LUNCH (1959).
102 Attorney Gen. v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch," 218 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1965).
103 Robert Batey, Naked Lunch for Lawyers: William S. Burroughs on Capital
Punishment, Pornography, the Drug Trade, and the Predatory Nature of Human
Interaction, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 101, 131 (1996).
104Id. at 130.
105 See Adam Fraser, Note, Protected from Their Own Beliefs: Religious Objectors
and Paternalistic Laws, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 185, 194 (2003) (arguing that paternalistic
laws regulating psychoactives have the potential and frequent tendency to over-regulate
the religious freedom of individuals).
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B. Organizational Control of Consciousness: Allopathic Versus
Osteopathic Medicine
Doctors, the primary point of contact for access to psychoactives with
governmentally perceived medical benefits, are not immune to the use of the
law to control both the structure of medicine and the right of access to
individual practitioners to "controlled substances." Leading up to the last
twenty years, a long struggle existed between traditional (allopathic)
physicians (i.e., M.D.s) and holistic or preventative (osteopathic) physicians
(i.e., D.O.s) over the right to proscribe prescription substances, including
psychoactives. 10 6 This struggle for recognition by D.O.s, which met with
continued resistance by M.D.s, shows how the long-term development of
osteopathic medicine was challenged by the institutional interests of
allopathic physicians. 10 7 The ability to regulate consciousness produces a
guarded effect with the intent to limit access to professional resources, which
in turn has an effect on the ability of individuals to gain access to
psychoactive substances.10 8
The debate over the expansion of "traditional" medicine to include
"nontraditional," that is, holistic or preventative medicines, is a culturally-
specific but international debate, 109 as well as an exercise in cultural
linguistics over how to refer properly to complimentary and alternative
medicine (CAM). 110 The converse debate exists in many foreign countries
where "nontraditional" medicine as defined in the United States has been
traditional for some time. 111 This imposition of western medicine on a
106 Boozang, supra note 25, at 186.
107 Oddly, the low cost of preventative medicine and alternative healthcare is
sometimes cited by legislators as a reason not to encourage the widespread acceptance of
CAM. See Kristen J. Josefek, Note, Alternative Medicine's Roadmap to Mainstream, 26
AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 304 (2000) (noting that opponents of CAM worry that
"disadvantaged or under-represented classes feel more comfortable visiting these
practitioners and may be seduced by their attentiveness [and lower cost]"). Given the
historical background of the regulation of psychoactives in the United States, this
"concern" coincides with the frequent tendency of Congress to enact legislation that
controls access to substances and services that may benefit or already be associated with
underprivileged or impoverished social or cultural classes of individuals.
108 See Boozang, supra note 25, at 187.
109 In the United States, a sharp increase in the use of CAM highlights the difficulty
and obvious relativism of defining treatments as "alternative." Fred M. Frohock, Moving
Lines and Variable Criteria: Differences/Connections Between Allopathic and
Alternative Medicine, 583 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 214,216-17 (2002).
110 See, e.g., Cohen & Ruggie, supra note 15.
111 In South Asia, particularly in India, the struggle between "modem" and
"alternative" medicines is best demonstrated by the process of modernizing "Ayurveda,"
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historically "nontraditional" cultural approach to medicine has important
implications with respect to the need for development of controlled substance
laws that reflect the influx of foreign cultural practices. In China, for
example, increased advertising by American pharmaceutical companies has
led to the increased diagnosis of psychological disorders such as
schizophrenia. 112
Further complications for access to medicine, including behavioral
psychoactives in developing countries, are added by challenges to the
property rights of drug discovery processes 113 and the struggle between third-
world traditional medicine and western synthetic drug production. 114 In.
addition to property rights issues, the use of human subjects for testing of
pharmaceuticals in third-world countries presents a novel conflict between
the desire to effectively control consciousness through clinical testing and the
human rights of local populations in developing nations.
From the biotechnology perspective, corporations often view negative
local health situations not as crises, but rather as good opportunities for
clinical trials. The crystallization, rather than the elimination of health
inequalities, fuels the growing industry of human subjects research. This is
inherently in opposition to the ideals of many bioethicists and presents a
socio-economic dilemma that must somehow be reconciled. Anthropologist
Adriana Petryna suggests that the autonomy of individuals is lost in the quest
for cheaper pools of clinical trial subjects: "Understanding the existing
variability in the regulation of ethics and the coinages through which
consent, autonomy, and drug markets evolve helps build an ethnographic
which is the equivalent of and has contributed to the development of osteopathic
medicine in the United States. Sita Reddy, Asian Medicine in America: The Ayurvedic
Case, 583 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97, 102 (2002). Ayurveda consists of
both "humoral diagnostics," (based on a "tripartite system of mind-body typologies") and
a combination of internal medicine, herbal remedies, and rejuvenation programs, similar
to the holistic and preventative approach of osteopathic physicians in the United States.
Id. at 101. In response to challenges of legitimacy, the approach taken by Ayurvedic
practitioners in India was to create "parallel institutions and an official, professionalized
system of Ayurvedic knowledge for [modem India]." Id. at 102.
112 Arthur Kleinman, Harvard University, Department of Anthropology, Chair
(personal communication, May 2002). See generally ARTHUR KLEINMAN, PATIENTS AND
HEALERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE BORDERLAND
BETWEEN ANTHROPOLOGY, MEDICINE, AND PSYCHIATRY (1980) (discussing the
interrelationship between increased cultural contact and the development of medical and
psychiatric policy in other cultures, with specific emphasis on Asia).
113 See Michael J. Huft, Comment, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery
Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995).
114 Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New
Technologies, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 523, 523-24 (2002).
13332005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
context that may ultimately provide the basis for a critique of market-driven
human research."1 15
Whereas osteopathic physicians would seek to prevent such health crises,
in a responsive allopathic approach the real-world benefits of testing
psychoactive substances for depression and mental health regulation are
often weighed against the human rights of individuals and whole
populations. 116 Similarly, "[m]arket-oriented medical ethics creates the
semblance of [normatively] ethical [practices]."'"17 The struggle between
traditional and nontraditional medicine in America and other countries shows
how the needs of one country and the laws promulgated by developed
nations can have a proportionate disparate impact on undeveloped nations
that may be exploited under biased substantive international laws.
C. Peyotism as Consolidated Political Power
Although peyote has been used by Native American groups for
thousands of years, the modem religious movement of Peyotism is a recent
cultural exercise of tradition to dictate substantive federal law. In essence, the
modem Peyotism movement among Native American groups shows how
modem political activism can alter the dominant social approach to
regulating consciousness by changing federal law.
Perhaps echoing the ideas of Leary and Ginsberg from the 1960s, the
Native American Church (a recent social conglomeration of various Native
groups) successfully pursued the acquisition of individual rights to alter
consciousness-in direct opposition to the Controlled Substances Act.1 18 In
1994, in direct response to a flurry of legal activities surrounding the
religious rights of indigenous groups to alter consciousness in a spiritual
context, 119 amendments were made to the American Indian Religious
115 Adriana Petryna, Ethical Variability: Drug Development and Globalizing
Clinical Trials, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 183, 192-93 (2005).116 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Last Commodity: Post Human Ethics and the
Global Traffic in "Fresh" Organs, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS
AND ETHICS As ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 145, 163 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J.
Collier eds., 2005).
117Id
118 Autumn Gray, Note, Effects of The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments on Criminal Law: Will Peyotism Eat Away at the Controlled Substances
Act?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 769, 770 (1995).
119 See Ann E. Beeson, Comment, Dances With Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41
EMORY L.J. 1121, 1149-1162 (1992) (discussing the legal history of attempts to
decriminalize the religious use of peyote by Native Americans in ritual contexts).
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Freedom Act that decriminalized peyote use by the Native American
Church.' 2
0
This decriminalization of native ingestion of peyote was the hard-fought
result of years of political lobbying for indigenous rights among Native
Americans. Tradition and social practice were effectively transformed into
federal law on the control of consciousness. Interesting in this
transformation, though, is that the Native American Church, the group for
whom the exemption for peyote use exists, is a modem socially-contrived
vehicle for decriminalization as much as it is a legitimate indigenous
religious organization.' 21 Similarly interesting is the potential that such
political activism has for the use of similar consolidation tactics by other
minority groups desiring to self-regulate the control of consciousness in a
religious or spiritual context.122
D. Kava in a Global Market
Kava is one of many supplements that will likely serve as a test case
123
for future statutory reforms to the FDA control of dietary supplements, and
particularly those that may alter consciousness; any such reform should and
must take into account the social contexts in which kava has traditionally
been used. 124 The use of kava in both recreational settings and in CAM is
120 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996a (2000). This statutory nod to Native interest groups is given further force by 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2000), the regulatory exemption from Schedule I classification for
religious "nondrug" use of peyote by the Native American Church. Neither the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act nor the regulatory exemption define "nondrug" use.
121 See John Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the
Native American Church: A Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and
Establishment Issues Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 475, 478 (1998).
122 See Christopher Andrew Eason, Note, O'Centro v. Ashcrofi. American Indians'
Efforts to Secure Religious Freedoms Are Paving the Way for Other Minority Religious
Groups, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 327, 343 (2003-2004).
123 Indeed, kava has already been identified as such in the context of Canadian
regulation of "natural health products." Boon & Wong, supra note 44.
124 See Chris Landers, The Kava Crackdown, GOvERNING MAG., Jan. 2005, at 14
(reporting the recent law enforcement trend in California to apprehend individuals for
"driving under the influence of kava"). Given kava's classification as a dietary
supplement and not a controlled substance under the CSA (kava is, thus, not subject to
the regulatory schema of alcohol and tobacco), these successful prosecutions of
individuals for driving under the influence of kava are analogous to successfully
prosecuting an individual for driving under the influence of coffee. Based on little more
than an admission of consumption and expert testimony as to its effects (including any
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increasing sharply in the United States. Unlike the adoption of "traditional"
Peyotism as a political tactic for legitimation of traditional practices, the use
of kava has jumped its cultural boundaries in an almost entirely unregulated
market in which cultural context is absent and no social norms govern the
control of consciousness via kava use. 125 The very substance that is banned
in numerous European countries is unregulated in the rest of the world.
Potential health risks are studied by federal agencies like the Food and
Drug Administration in the United States, but kava use, once divorced from
its Pacific Islands origins, is governed primarily by social practice, which is
often unfounded on traditional understanding or traditional means of
control. 126
Rather than the traditional control of cultural practice and mythology that
regulates kava in most Pacific Island cultures, the use of kava in western or
westernized contexts. presents a unique problem. A substance that can alter
consciousness, but is unregulated by either federal law or traditional cultural
practices has the high potential for abuse by individuals who may be unaware
of adverse effects known only to the socially acculturated kava user. From
sakau bars in Pohnpei, 127 to the widespread distribution of kava as an herbal
supplement, 128 the unregulated use of certain substances must lead inevitably
impairment of motor skills), prosecutors in San Mateo, California (or anywhere) could
theoretically prosecute anyone for driving "under the influence" of anything. See id.
Interestingly, the FDA has just recently begun comprehensive testing of the actual
chemical composition and physiological effects of kava. See U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Food and Drink Products Containing Kava Analyzed, MED. & LAW
WKLY., Feb. 18, 2005, at 416 (explaining the development by the FDA of a "method for
the determination of six kava lactones, methysticin, dihydromethysticin, kawain,
dihydrokawain, yangonin, and desmethoxyyangonin, in solid foods and beverages").
125 See, e.g., Are Diet Supplements Safe?, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2004, at 20A
(noting that kava and numerous other dietary supplements, though linked to liver damage
and death, are largely unregulated). See also Raduege, supra note 53, at 309 ("Kava may
cause neurological side effects .... [and] has hepatotoxic side effects.") But cf Rarabici,
supra note 49 (discussing the efforts by certain Pacific Island lobbying groups, citing
recent medical research, to deregulate kava in currently restrictive European markets).
126 See, e.g., Joshua H. Beisler, Note, Dietary Supplements and Their Discontents:
FDA Regulation and the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 511 (2000) (arguing that the control of dietary supplements is much looser
in the wake of federal legislation to relax FDA control).
127 Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Professor of Law, The Ohio State Univ., Moritz College
of Law (personal communication Nov. 2004).
128 Kava is available at most herbal supplement or vitamin stores in the continental
United States, for example, in a standardized 250 milligram or 400 milligram capsule
with regulated (though not standardized) concentrations of kava. But see Edzard Ernst,
Commentary, Prescribing Herbal Medicines Appropriately, 53 J. FAM. PRAc. 985, 987
("The quality of an herbal preparation partly determines its efficacy as well as its safety.
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to conflicts between law, myth, and tradition. Such conflicts will be resolved
not only through legal responses, but also through social perceptions and
responses to such legislative and judicial remedies.
In many ways, traditions for the use of kava and other relatively
unregulated supplements are already developing in the form of the health
supplement industry's self-regulation. Given the strong industry interest in
standardization and consumer demands for a consistent product, most herbal
supplements (including kava) include recommended dosage information.
Unfortunately, most supplements lack any direct information on the intended
uses and consequences of ingestion (owing to FDA regulatory imposition of
restrictions). 129 The control of consciousness is often a commercial enterprise
involving such disparate interests as indigenous practices (and local
knowledge) and international health standards or the desire to experiment
with individual health (i.e., nontraditional medical practices)..
V. A PRE-REFORM PROPOSAL: MAKING ROOM FOR THE CULTURAL
CONTROL OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS IN COMPLIMENTARY AND
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE
In the complex adaptive system of human interaction that seeks to
control consciousness-on either an individual or a societal level-the
inevitable exchange and cross-fertilization of law, myth, and tradition
produces interesting syntheses. Whereas law acts normally as the cultureless
positivism of a society at large, the myth and tradition of particular societies
temper such unchecked relativism by serving as the natural law of individual
agency. These disparate interests are weighed repeatedly as cultures and
societies interact and encounter unique problems with respect to the control
of consciousness. 130 Iterations of this theme of cross-fertilization13' breed
Herbal dietary supplements are not usually regulated as drugs and have repeatedly been
found to vary in quality, sometimes being suboptimal.").
129 Although the DSHEA allows for lessened restrictions on dietary supplements,
the FDA has attempted to limit the ability of dietary supplement manufacturers to make
specific health claims by adopting and applying ambiguous or undefined criteria for
determining whether the claims are supported by "significant scientific agreement."
Spencer, supra note 47, at 97.
130 Among such problems is the potential to create internally inconsistent
regulations or statutes that promote "corrosive and confusing moral hypocrisy" that
reflects not the policy choices of collective agency, but rather the "true moral judgments"
of individual actors in positions of power. See Galiber, supra note 27, at 840.
131 See generally Batey, supra note 103 (discussing law as tradition, law as culture,
law as myth, tradition as culture, tradition as myth, and culture as myth-all as studied
through various media).
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infinite, unique anthropological issues that may be studied through the
converse eyes of individuals or the laws that human societies enact.
Differential access to health resources is a natural product of capitalism
in the strict sense that costlier treatments will be available only to those who
can afford them.132 One lesson from the history of psychoactive substance
regulation in the United States is that many statutory and agency-based
regulations restrict the right of access with respect to resource-deprived
groups. 133 Current U.S. policy toward controlling psychoactive substances
should and must both allow for and encourage the testing of the empirical
basis for regulation as well as current social perceptions of the actual effects
or harms of a given substance. 134 Similarly, substance control policy should
be economically efficient. 135 Laws that mimic such findings may ultimately
132 One area in which differential access is not as prevalent is in the management of
pain in terminally or chronically ill patients. Access to the management of pain is less
differential because the ability of physicians to prescribe effective medications is
ubiquitously inadequate. See Dilcher, supra note 31, at 82-83, 99 (arguing that the
liberalization, both federal and state, of opioids could decrease the inefficacy of pain
management in the United States as such liberalization "would benefit a significant
number of patients suffering from acute and chronic pain").
133 Another lesson, of course, is that Congress seems generally unaware of or
willfully blind to the scientific rationale for categorizing psychoactive substances into
distinct regulatory schema. The false trichotomy in the United States between "drugs,"
"alcohol and tobacco," and "dietary supplements" ignores the scientific reality of how
specific substances function physiologically on brain chemistry. See, e.g., Vik et al.,
supra note 35, at 100, 102; see also Boon & Wong, supra note 44, at 1163 (reporting the
reclassification of kava by the Canadian government from a "natural health product" to a
"drug"). Furthermore, courtroom evidence procedure has sometimes removed the
necessity to even identify substances as being "controlled." Michael D. Blanchard &
Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on Drugs: A Critique of the Developing
Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White Powder in Narcotics
Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 557, 590 (1998) (noting the increased occurrence of
prosecution testimony identifying "controlled substances" based on nothing more than
visual identification).
134 The scientific verification of dietary supplement efficacy was one of the FDA's
goals in implementing the DSHEA. Joseph A. Levitt, Regulation of Dietary Supplements:
FDA's Strategic Plan, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2002).
135 Much research and recent discussion suggest that current pharmaceutical-based,
reactive allopathic approaches to healthcare encourage both economic inefficiency and
federal legislation based on the lobbying interests of highly profitable pharmaceutical
companies, rather than the general healthcare needs of individuals and state actors.
Marcia Angell, Over and Above: Excess in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 171 CAN. MED.
Ass'N J. 1451, 1451-52 (2004). Although the DSHEA presumably makes access to
dietary supplements easier, restrictions on the ability of supplement manufacturers to
make claims as to medical efficacy of supplements to "treat, prevent, cure, mitigate, or
diagnose a specific disease" limits the competition of dietary supplements with traditional
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have to reflect facts that differ from social mythology or our cultural
traditions. 136 In the same way that osteopathic physicians have gained
increased respect and legitimacy, so too will alternative "dietary
supplements" that actually regulate human consciousness gain increased
support. 137 By allowing these "non-traditional" medicines to remain outside
of the scheme of strict FDA regulation, the risk of product safety remains on
the manufacturer, not on the U.S. government. The combined effect of this
minimal regulation of increasingly accepted treatments would likely be the
lowering of mainstream healthcare costs.138
A converse argument could also be made that explicit inclusion of
dietary supplements could lead to higher economic efficiency and broader
access to CAM and healthcare, generally. 139 Through the process of
pharmaceuticals. Stephen Bent & Richard Ko, Commonly Used Herbal Medicines in the
United States: A Review, 116 AM. J. MED. 478, 479 (2004).
136 For example, if drug addiction is an involuntary brain disease, our current penal
code would likely prove an inappropriate means for the regulation of controlled
substances. See Sally L. Satel; Is Drug Addiction a Brain Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION
AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE? 118, 140 (Philip B.
Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001) (arguing against the brain disease
model) [hereinafter DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY]; George E. Vaillant, If
Addiction Is Involuntary, How Can Punishment Help?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG
POLICY, supra, at 144, 146 (calling for more treatment-based approaches to controlling
substance abuse). See also Laughlin, supra note 94 (arguing against the retributive
approach to the regulation of psychotomimetic substances).
137 It should be noted, however, that the increased acceptance of dietary supplement
alternatives to traditional pharmaceuticals will come slowly and at the expense of current
state regulatory and insurance schemes. See Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care:
Including Alternative and Complementary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory
Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 83, 86 (1996) ("[The] current scope of practice and [state]
disciplinary schemes [for physicians] inhibit the integration of alternative and
complementary medicine into modem health care, and unfairly discriminate against
physicians and others who utilize holistic therapies.").
138 See Michael S. Goldstein, The Emerging Socioeconomic and Political Support
for Alternative Medicine in the United States, 583 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
44, 46 (2002) (noting that in the last twenty years CAM "has emerged as part of the
mainstream practice of medicine in the United States"). See also Jackson, supra note 26
(noting that "[a]bout 13 percent of the 38 million Americans who used alternative
remedies [in 2004] did so mainly to lower their prescription bills"). The potential
economic efficiency of CAM was also a primary reason for the recent decision of the
government of Bangladesh to establish the "Bangladesh Institute of Medicinal and
Aromatic Plants." See Govt to Set up Institute for Herbal Plants, UNITED NEWS OF
BANGLADESH, June 15, 2005,
http://www.unbnews.com/index.php?show=all&id=2&date=1 5-06-2005.
139 This argument is founded on the essential free market economic construct that
competition tends to lead to efficiency. Specifically, competition in the context of
pharmaceutical/dietary supplement access would remain efficient without regard to the
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explicitly mainstreaming CAM and integrating dietary supplements into the
pharmaceutically regulated pharmacopoeia, alternatives to many common
pharmaceuticals could increase options for consumers and create competition
for drug companies.
Federal and local regulation has often served as an expression of
collective social agency, on various levels, and has frequently been directed
at controlling the impact of potentially influential external cultural groups,
not directed at appropriately regulating the individual activity of actors
within American society. 140 The Federal CSA and our national policy of a
"war" on selected "controlled substances" is, in many ways, the political and
historical embodiment of collective Judeo-Christian ideology and
functionally ignores the scientific reality of psychoactive substances.
Recognition of this cultural bias is a key to enacting legislation and
regulations that will look past cultural preconceptions and build sound public
policy from both positive law and normative shared understandings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether a manifestation of law, myth, or tradition, the regulation of
consciousness is an inevitable function of organized society. The
interrelationships between law, myth, and tradition in historic, modem, and
cross-cultural perspectives demonstrate the wide variety of approaches to
control, from strict classifications of "controlled substances" to flexible intra-
cultural pressures at the level of individual agency. The unique development
of any government's attempts to regulate consciousness must be understood
in a historical perspective, but also must account for the current needs of both
government (i.e., collective agency) and individuals (i.e., personal
autonomy).
In the United States, multiple stimuli, from international deregulation of
certain psychoactives to the quickly syncretizing practices of traditional
allopathic medicine and CAM, are already imposing the need to reevaluate
federal schemes of classification. A part of this reevaluation should include a
reevaluation of the empirical justifications for classification of substances on
the current Schedules under the CSA. Furthermore, given a history of
misclassification and paternalism with respect to both CAM and
psychoactive substances, in particular, the current U.S. policy of relaxed
regulation of nutritional supplements should be continued so as to allow for
the competitive application of CAM to the current crisis in the American
health care system.
allocation of product liability. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 5-7 (1960) (without transaction costs, the assignment of liability does
not affect allocation of resources, and that allocation remains efficient).
140 See discussion in Part II.B, supra.
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